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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to study the effects of entry into the market for a
single commodity in which both sellers and buyers are permitted to interact strategically.
With the inclusion of an additional seller, the market is quasi-competitive: the price falls
and volume of trade increases, as expected. However, contrary to the conventional wisdom,
existing sellers’ payoffs may increase. The conditions under which entry by new sellers
raises the equilibrium payoffs of existing sellers are derived. These depend in an intuitive
way on the elasticity of a strategic analog of demand and the market share of existing
sellers, and encompass entirely standard economic environments. Similar results are derived
relating to the entry of additional buyers and the effects of entry on both sides of the market
are investigated.
Keywords: bilateral oligopoly; entry; comparative statics; aggregative games
1. Introduction
The conventional wisdom in imperfectly competitive markets is that an increase in the number of
firms is harmful to existing firms in the industry. The question that motivates this study is the following:
if both buyers as well as sellers are permitted to behave strategically in a model of bilateral oligopoly,
does this conventional wisdom apply? The answer to this question is: “not always”. To establish interest
in the study an example of a completely standard economic environment is presented in which there are
few buyers and few sellers and the number of the latter is increased by one. In the new equilibrium,
not only are buyers made better off but existing sellers also receive a higher payoff. Motivated by this
example, a general model of bilateral oligopoly is studied, and by exploiting the aggregative structure
of the game played, the precise conditions under which “profit-increasing competition” is observed
are derived, which depend in an intuitive way on the market fundamentals. A similar analysis is
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undertaken for the entry of additional buyers, and the effects of entry on both sides of the market
are investigated.
The effects of entry by additional sellers to an oligopoly industry have seen much attention in the
literature. Under standard restrictions on payoffs, it is found that markets organized a` la Cournot are
quasi-competitive; industry output increases and price falls when additional firms enter (Frank [1],
Ruffin [2], Okuguchi [3], Seade [4]). A direct implication is that the (price-taking) buyers benefit
from such a change. Study of existing firms’ profit when additional firms enter the industry shows
that more intense competition reduces equilibrium profit (Seade [4], Result R4, Amir and Lambson [5],
Theorem 2.2). As such, under the threat of entry by additional firms, incumbent firms in an industry are
incentivized to deter such entry, and it is based on this premise that the vast literature on entry deterrence
has grown.
In bilateral oligopoly, buyers, as well as sellers, are allowed to behave strategically and a natural
question is whether the conclusions that form the conventional wisdom in Cournot oligopoly (and their
counterparts in oligopsony) apply, providing an answer to which is the aim of this paper. The market
works as follows. There is a single consumption good and money; buyers are endowed with money
whilst sellers are endowed with the good. Trade takes place by buyers submitting an amount of their
endowment of money to a trading post to be exchanged for the good, and sellers deciding on a level
of supply to the trading post. These bids and offers are aggregated and the rate of exchange of the
good for money—the price—is determined as the ratio of aggregate bid to aggregate offer. Buyers then
receive a proportional share of the total supply of the good, and sellers receive a proportional share of the
total bids.
There is a small but important literature that studies the comparative static properties of bilateral
oligopoly. Bloch and Ghosal [6] study a model with identical traders on each side of the market, showing
that an increase in the number of traders on one side of the market can increase the equilibrium payoff
of traders on the opposite side of the market. They also comment on the possibility of perverse effects
on traders’ payoffs when the number of players on their own side of the market increases, but do not
pursue this line of enquiry. Groh [7] presents an example that illustrates this observation. Dickson
and Hartley [8] allow for heterogeneity amongst traders and undertake a comparative static analysis
but are focused only on the effect on equilibrium aggregates. Amir and Bloch [9] study the effects of
increasing the number of buyers in an environment where symmetry is imposed amongst sellers and
buyers, providing some results on equilibrium aggregates and on the equilibrium payoffs of sellers; this
contributes substantially to the literature on bilateral oligopoly but is limited by the fact that traders are
assumed to be homogeneous (although some results are generalized to the heterogeneous-traders case)
and there is no analysis of the effect on individual traders from an increase in the number of agents on
their own side of the market. Indeed, the paper concludes by highlighting the need for a comprehensive
characterization of comparative statics with heterogeneous players. This paper aims to contribute to the
literature precisely by filling this gap.
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Dickson and Hartley’s study of bilateral oligopoly [8] showed that the aggregative structure1 of the
game can be exploited to provide a tractable analysis of equilibrium with heterogeneous traders. Strategic
supply and demand functions are constructed that represent the aggregate supply and demand consistent
with a Nash equilibrium in which the price takes a particular value, intersections of which identify Nash
equilibria. According to the identified equilibrium price and volume of trade, individual strategies can
then be found as those consistent with a Nash equilibrium in which the price and aggregate supply take
these values.
The addition of a seller to the economy changes strategic supply in a tractable way and leaves strategic
demand unaffected. The effect on the equilibrium price and volume of trade can be easily deduced, from
where the impact on individual actions can be determined as the change in strategy required to achieve
consistency with a Nash equilibrium with the new price and aggregate supply. Using this method, the
effect of an additional seller on the equilibrium actions of existing buyers and sellers can be found and
the change in their equilibrium payoffs derived, even when the set of traders is heterogeneous. Similarly,
the addition of a buyer leaves strategic supply unaffected but has a tractable effect on strategic demand
using which the effect on equilibrium aggregates and on individual traders can be found.
Whilst equilibrium aggregates move in the expected direction in the presence of additional traders
(the volume of trade increases, and the price declines with additional sellers and increases with additional
buyers), the effect on existing traders on the side of the market where competition has increased is far
from standard: in “thin” markets increased competition can be payoff-increasing. The intuition for this
finding comes from recognizing that in bilateral oligopoly traders on each side of the market can be
thought of as engaging in a proportional-sharing contest where the size of the “prize” is determined
by the aggregate actions of the traders on the other side of the market. For example, in an economy
with an additional seller aggregate supply in equilibrium will increase. In competing for their share of
this larger prize buyers may increase their bids. If so, and the aggregate bid increases, then sellers that
individually supplied more may, despite the fact that their contest is more competitive, receive a higher
individual allocation of the prize, which is precisely their revenue. If the increase in utility from this
higher revenue outweighs the reduction in utility from lower final holdings of the good (when sellers are
modeled as firms this amounts to the additional revenue exceeding the increased costs of production) then
the seller’s payoff will increase. Whether this is observed depends on if, and by how much, the aggregate
bid increases. To measure the change in aggregate bid the elasticity of strategic demand is defined, and
the condition for a seller’s payoff to increase requires this elasticity to exceed a certain threshold that
is inversely related to the seller’s market share: markets with sufficiently elastic strategic demand and
sellers with large enough market shares will exhibit the features of profit-increasing competition. As
the number of sellers increases, however, the market share of existing sellers declines, implying that
when the market is large enough the conventional wisdom applies. An analogous analysis when buyers
enter with similar intuition reveals that with the entry of additional buyers, an existing buyer will enjoy
1A game is aggregative when each player’s payoff can be expressed as a function of their own strategy and the aggregate
of all players’ strategies. This structure can be exploited in the analysis of the game enabling techniques that differ from
standard best response analysis to be used in studying equilibrium that avoid using many-dimensional fixed-point theorems,
even with heterogeneous players. See, for example, Novshek [10] for an application to Cournot competition, Cornes and
Hartley [11] for an application to contests and Corcho´n [12] and Jensen [13] for treatments of general aggregative games.
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payoff-increasing competition if the slope of strategic supply exceeds a threshold that is inversely related
to her market share and also depends on her preferences.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model and assumptions, and Section 3
presents an example that is returned to in Section 7. Section 4 discusses the method of analysis that
exploits the aggregative properties of the game (so that the paper is self-contained, Appendix A contains
a derivation of strategic supply and demand functions). Sections 5 and 6 contain the analysis at the
aggregate and individual level of the entry of additional sellers. Section 8 considers entry of additional
buyers, after which concluding remarks follow. All proofs are collected in Appendix B.
2. The Trading Environment
To allow for strategic behavior by both sellers and buyers a model of bilateral
oligopoly originally due to Gabszewicz and Michel [14] is utilized in which the rules of a
Shapley-Shubik strategic market game [15] are imposed. There are two commodities: the first
(denoted y1) is a consumption good, and the second (y2) a commodity money. The (index) set of agents
I is partitioned into IS [ IB, each of which contains at least two traders and where IS \ IB = ;; agents
i 2 IS are endowed only with an amount ei > 0 of the good and so are sellers, whilst agents i 2 I
B are
endowed only with mi > 0 units of money and so are buyers.
Each seller i 2 IS decides on a quantity xi 2 [0, ei] of the good to supply to the market to be
exchanged for money. At the same time, each buyer decides on the amount of her endowment of money
bi 2 [0,mi] to be sent to the market to be exchanged for the good. Given a vector of such offers and
bids detailing each trader’s action, the market aggregates supply to X =
P
j2IS xj and money bids to
B =
P
j2IB bj , and determines the market clearing price as p = B/X . If B · X = 0 the market is
deemed closed and no trade takes place; traders are left with their initial endowment.
When trade occurs sellers receive a proportional share x/X of the total bids made to the market and
buyers receive a proportional share b/B of the total quantity of the good supplied to the market. Traders
evaluate their final allocation according to a twice continuously differentiable real-valued utility function
ui : R
2
+ ! R. The payoff to each seller is ui(ei−x, xp) and that to each buyer is ui(b/p,mi− b). Define
@i(y) as the marginal rate of substitution at the allocation y = (y1, y2), and let p
⇤
i denote the marginal
rate of substitution at the endowment: p⇤i = @i(ei, 0) for i 2 I
S whilst p⇤i = @i(0,mi) for i 2 I
B.
These trading rules constitute a well-defined game, and the equilibrium concept used is that of Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies. Whilst there is always an equilibrium in which every agent bids/offers
zero, in the sequel attention is confined to non-autarkic Nash equilibria in which trade takes place.
Throughout the paper, traders’ payoff functions are assumed to be binormal: if y1  y
0
1 and
y2 ≥ y
0
2 then @i(y) ≥ @i(y
0), where the final inequality is strict if y1 < y
0
1 and y2 > 0. This implies
@@i(y)/@y1 < 0 and @@i(y)/@y2 ≥ 0, and that competitive income expansion paths are upward-sloping
(in (y1, y2)-space). Binormality is a relatively innocuous but critical assumption: without it traders’
optimal decisions may not be unique, giving rise to obvious complications for the analysis that follows.
Two additional properties of preferences will be important to the analysis (but are not assumed from
the outset). The first that will be applied to the sellers is coined “increasing competitive supply” (ICS).
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Definition 1. The preferences of trader i 2 I satisfy increasing competitive supply (ICS) if y02 > y2
) @i(y1, y
0
2)/y
0
2  @i(y)/y2 for any y1 > 0, which implies y2@@i(y)/@y2 − @i(y)  0. If @i(y)/y2 is
(strictly) increasing in y2 then preferences satisfy “decreasing competitive supply” (DCS).
2
The second will be applied to the buyers and is called “elastic competitive demand”.
Definition 2. The preferences of trader i 2 I satisfy elastic competitive demand (ECD) if y01 > y1 )
y01@i(y
0
1, y2) ≥ y1@i(y) for any y2 > 0, which implies @i(y) + y1@@i(y)/@y1 ≥ 0. If y1@i(y) is (strictly)
decreasing in y1 then preferences satisfy “inelastic competitive demand”(ICD).
3
If a trader’s preferences satisfy both ICS and ECD with strict inequalities for all y then the gross
substitutes property, as used by Amir and Bloch [9], is satisfied.
Remark. An important special case allows sellers to be modeled as profit-maximizing firms, permitting
comparison with standard partial equilibrium models. For each i 2 IS define ei = 0 and ⇡i = ui(y) =
y2−Ci(−y1) = xp−Ci(x) with C
0
i, C
00
i > 0 . Sellers may then be thought of as choosing supply xi ≥ 0
that incurs costs of production. With this specification @i(y) = C
0
i(−y1); since this is independent of y2
ICS is globally satisfied. (Constant marginal costs can be accommodated in the analysis as a special
case: see footnote 18 in Appendix A.)
If buyers are assumed to be price-takers, Cournot competition is a quantity-setting game amongst
sellers modeled as profit-maximizing firms, assuming the buyers are represented by an inverse demand
function (which will be decreasing, due to binormality). As noted in the Introduction, Cournot
competition is quasi-competitive and entry by additional firms lowers the equilibrium profit of existing
firms. The current study begins by investigating whether this established wisdom also applies in bilateral
oligopoly. The next section provides a motivating example.
3. Example
Consider an economy in which there are four buyers each with an endowment of two units of money
and quadratic preferences given by u(y) = 3y1−
1
4
y21+y2, and two sellers modeled as profit-maximizing
firms each with quadratic costs given by C(x) = 1
2
x + 5
2
x2. Note that quadratic costs and preferences
give linear competitive supply and demand functions; whilst quadratic preferences permit utility to be
decreasing in y1 when consumption of y1 is high, this will never be the case in equilibrium. There
is a symmetric non-autarkic equilibrium in the economy (arguments presented in Appendix A ensure
this is the unique non-autarkic equilibrium), and the first-order conditions imply that the equilibrium
supply of each seller is xˆ ⇡ 0.12 and the equilibrium bid of each buyer is bˆ ⇡ 0.14. The resulting
2The competitive first-order condition is ∂i(ei − x, xp) = p, implicit differentiation of which reveals sgn
n
dx
dp
o
=
sgn
n
− 1p
⇣
y2
∂∂i(y)
∂y2
− ∂i(y)
⌘o
when preferences are binormal. Thus, competitive supply is increasing (decreasing) if and
only if ∂i(y)/y2 is decreasing (increasing) in y2.
3When preferences are binormal, whether competitive demand is elastic or inelastic depends on whether y1∂i(y) is
increasing or decreasing in y1. To see this, write the competitive first-order condition as ∂i
⇣
(y1p)
p ,mi − (y1p)
⌘
= p;
implicit differentiation yields sgn
n
d(y1p)
dp
o
= sgn
n
− 1p
⇣
∂i(y) + y1
∂∂i(y)
∂y1
⌘o
and demand is elastic (unit elastic, inelastic)
when
d(y1p)
dp < (=, >)0. (Due to the weak inequality ECD allows for unit-elastic demand.)
Games 2013, 4 288
equilibrium price is pˆ ⇡ 2.23. Equilibrium payoffs are uˆ ⇡ 2.05 for the buyers and ⇡ˆ ⇡ 0.17
for the sellers.
If a further seller enters the market then the new equilibrium supply of each seller is xˆ0 ⇡ 0.19 and
the equilibrium bid of each buyer is bˆ0 ⇡ 0.32. The equilibrium price is thus pˆ0 ⇡ 2.20. The payoff to
each buyer at the new equilibrium is uˆ0 ⇡ 2.11 > uˆ and the payoff to each seller is ⇡ˆ0 ⇡ 0.23 > ⇡ˆ.
Aggregate supply increases and the price reduces in the presence of an additional seller (the market is
quasi-competitive), but contrary to the conventional wisdom, sellers (as well as buyers) are made better
off. Notably, existing sellers increase their supply (and the aggregate supply increases) but the reduction
in price (p = B/X) is modest since buyers’ bids increase. Whether increased competition on the supply
side is profit-increasing for existing sellers will depend crucially on the change in the aggregate bid
from the buyers, which is the total revenue shared amongst the sellers. When buyers are price-takers
the behavior of total revenue is measured by the elasticity of competitive demand. In bilateral oligopoly
the conditions under which profit-increasing competition is observed will depend on the elasticity of the
strategic demand function.
4. Characterization of Equilibria
In bilateral oligopoly, sellers share the aggregate bid from the buyers in proportion to their supply,
whilst the aggregate supply from the sellers is shared amongst the buyers in proportion to their bids.
To analyze this “dual contest” with heterogeneous traders, fix, for each side of the market in turn, the
actions of the agents on the opposite side and consider the “partial game” that is played by the traders
on the side of the market in question. This partial game involves a proportional-sharing contest with
a fixed prize. The payoff to each player in this game depends only on their individual action and the
aggregate of all traders’ actions, which can be exploited to determine the equilibria of the game.4 Given
the aggregate action of traders on the opposite side of the market, an aggregate action of traders on the
side of the market in question is consistent with a Nash equilibrium within the partial game if and only
if the sum of the individual actions consistent with this exactly equals the aggregate action. Denote this
B˜(X) in the partial game played by the buyers and X˜ (B) in that played by the sellers. Nash equilibrium
in bilateral oligopoly requires consistency between the partial games (i.e., a fixed point of B˜(X˜ (B)), or
equivalently of X˜ (B˜(X))).
Dickson and Hartley [8] studied equilibrium in this game by characterizing aggregate supply X (p)
and aggregate bids B(p) consistent with a Nash equilibrium in which the price takes a particular value.
The ratio B(p)/p = D(p) gives demand for the good, and intersections of X (p) and D(p) identify
non-autarkic Nash equilibria. For the reader’s convenience, Appendix A contains a derivation of
these functions.
As Figure 1 illustrates and the description in Appendix A elucidates, strategic supply is a function
defined only for prices above a cutoff price P S and strategic demand is a function defined only for prices
below the cutoff PB (P S and PB are defined in Equations (11) and (15) respectively). Existence of a
non-autarkic Nash equilibrium requires P S < PB, which is assumed throughout the rest of the paper.
4Each partial game, with an appropriate change of variables, is strategically equivalent to a Tullock contest. Cornes and
Hartley [11] have studied equilibria in such games by exploiting their aggregative properties.
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When all buyers’ preferences are binormal, strategic demand is strictly decreasing in p ([8], Lemma 5.1)
but strategic supply may be non-monotonic.5 As such, multiple non-autarkic Nash equilibria may be
admitted. Attention in this paper will be confined to “regular” Nash equilibria, and to changes in the
environment that preserve the set of regular equilibria.6
Figure 1. The effect on equilibrium aggregates of an additional active seller.
Definition 3. A non-autarkic Nash equilibrium with price pˆ is regular if there is an ✏ > 0 such that for
all p 2 (pˆ− ✏, pˆ), X (p)  D(p) and for all p 2 (pˆ, pˆ+ ✏), X (p) ≥ D(p).
If there is a unique equilibrium then it is regular. Uniqueness of equilibrium is ensured when
strategic supply is non-decreasing in p, which is so when all sellers’ preferences are both binormal
and everywhere satisfy ICS ([8], Lemma 5.2, where the additional restriction on sellers’ preferences is
called “partial substitutes”).
At a non-autarkic Nash equilibrium with price pˆ the aggregate supply is Xˆ = X (pˆ) and the aggregate
bid is Bˆ = pˆD(pˆ). Individuals’ equilibrium strategies can be found by deducing their actions consistent
with a Nash equilibrium with these characteristics.
By analyzing bilateral oligopoly as two partial games, strategic supply and demand are defined
independently of the set of agents on the other side of the market, the appeal of which for an analysis
of the effects of entry is clear. The effect on the price and volume of trade from entry on one side of
the market can be found from the change in strategic supply or demand, as appropriate. The change
in individual strategies can then be determined by considering the individual actions that are consistent
with the new equilibrium aggregates and the change this implies.
5The asymmetry arises because the analysis is of transactions of the good denominated in units of commodity money:
like X (p), B(p) is non-monotonic when preferences are only binormal but B(p)/p = D(p) is.
6This is done to retain tractability of changes in individuals’ payoffs, which is the focus of the paper. Some deductions
can be made for aggregates at extremal equilibria even if the set of equilibria is not preserved; see Dickson and Hartley [8]
(Section 6.3) for some discussion of this.
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5. Aggregate Comparative Statics
Consider first the entry of an additional seller. When the set of sellers changes to IS0 = IS [ {k}
(post-change quantities are denoted with primes) nothing changes in the analysis of the buyers so the
effect on the price and volume of trade can be deduced from the change in strategic supply, which
increases for all prices exceeding p⇤k = @k(ek, 0) (see Dickson and Hartley [8], Section 6.1). As
inspection of Figure 1 makes clear, at any regular equilibrium where pˆ > p⇤k (in which the new seller will
be active) the equilibrium volume of trade will increase and the equilibrium price will decline.7
Proposition 1. Suppose an additional seller k joins the economy that preserves the set of equilibria.
Then any Nash equilibrium where pˆ  p⇤k is unchanged. Conversely, at any regular equilibrium where
pˆ > p⇤k the equilibrium price falls and the quantity of the good traded increases: pˆ
0 < pˆ and Xˆ 0 > Xˆ .
As such, regular equilibria in bilateral oligopoly exhibit the features of quasi-competitiveness: the
price reduces and the volume of trade increases when there is more supply-side competition.8
Whilst aggregate supply in the new equilibrium increases, the same conclusion cannot be drawn for
the aggregate bid: strategic demand is monotonic in p, but when buyers’ preferences are only binormal
the same cannot be said of the aggregate bid. The following lemma demonstrates that the conditions
on preferences that govern the change in the value of individual demand in a competitive framework
also govern the change in the value of aggregate demand consistent with a Nash equilibrium in
bilateral oligopoly.
Lemma 2. If, in addition to being binormal, all buyers’ preferences satisfy ECD (ICD), then
B(p0)  (>)B(p) for any PB > p0 > p > 0.
Since p = B/X and p decreases in the presence of an additional seller, if B increases, its proportional
increase must not exceed the proportional increase in X . Nevertheless, the aggregate bid may increase
and Lemma 2 gives the conditions under which this is so.
Corollary 3. Suppose an additional seller k enters the economy. If, in addition to being binormal,
all buyers’ preferences locally satisfy9 ECD (ICD), then Bˆ0 ≥ (<)Bˆ at any regular equilibrium where
pˆ > p⇤k.
In bilateral oligopoly the aggregate bid is the revenue shared amongst the sellers. It is useful to define
the elasticity of strategic demand as
⌘(p,∆p) = −
p∆D(p)
D(p)∆p
(1)
Since, by definition, B(p) = pD(p), strategic demand is elastic (inelastic) if and only if B(p) is
decreasing (increasing) in p, and so the conditions presented in Lemma 2 that govern the monotonicity
of the aggregate bid also govern whether strategic demand is elastic or inelastic.
7Amir and Bloch [9] (Propositions 1 and 2 and Claims 1 and 2) draw similar conclusions for the extremal aggregate bid
and price when buyers enter, although the conclusions for the change in price rely on traders being homogeneous.
8For any arbitrary expansion of the set of sellers, the same conclusion can be drawn for regular equilibria at which
pˆ > min{p⇤k}.
9The additional conditions on preferences need only be satisfied in a sufficiently large neighborhood of the original
equilibrium in question.
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6. Individual Comparative Statics
Attention now turns to deducing the effect of the introduction of a new seller on existing traders’
strategies and payoffs by determining their actions consistent with the new equilibrium aggregates and
the change this implies. To retain tractability the analysis is restricted to small changes, which can
be formally justified by confining attention to a regular equilibrium in which the price is pˆ, and the
introduction of a seller k who has p⇤k smaller than, but close to, pˆ.
10 This equilibrium is referred to as the
“closest regular equilibrium”.
Looking first at the buyers, the equilibrium payoff to buyer i 2 IB is uˆi = ui(bˆi/pˆ,mi− bˆi). Utilizing
the first-order condition (see Expression (12) in Appendix A), the change in her payoff is
duˆi = ((1/pˆ)u
1
i − u
2
i )dbˆi − (bˆi/pˆ
2)u1i dpˆ
= u1i /pˆ[(bˆi/Bˆ)dbˆi − (bˆi/pˆ)dpˆ] (2)
In the presence of an additional active seller, dpˆ < 0 and dXˆ > 0 (Proposition 1). If all buyers are
homogeneous then their payoffs necessarily increase regardless of their bid response: either all buyers
increase their bid, in which case the expression above is positive; or they all reduce their bid, in which
case the equilibrium payoff can be written ui((1/|I
B|)Xˆ,mi − bˆi), which necessarily increases since
mi − bˆi increases and dXˆ > 0. When buyers are heterogeneous, they may have different bid responses;
however, it is transparent from (2) that if all buyers increase their bid, they will each receive a higher
equilibrium payoff. The following proposition11 collects these ideas.
Proposition 4. Suppose an additional seller enters the economy. Then if either (a) all buyers’
preferences are not only binormal but also locally satisfy ECD or (b) all buyers are homogeneous, all
buyers at the closest regular equilibrium are made strictly better off.
With a heterogeneous buyer set and some buyers whose preferences satisfy ICD, there may be buyers
that optimally reduce their bid and suffer a lower level of equilibrium utility. Note, however, that even
if all buyers reduce their bid, not all buyers can be made worse off: they will retain more money
and their allocation of the good is (bˆi/Bˆ)Xˆ , which cannot decrease for all buyers since dXˆ > 0 andP
j2IB bˆj/Bˆ = 1.
Corollary 5. Any regular Nash equilibrium in the presence of an additional seller cannot be Pareto
inferior to the corresponding Nash equilibrium in the original economy.
Turning now to the supply side, the equilibrium payoff of seller i 2 IS is given by uˆi = ui(ei−xˆi, xˆipˆ).
The change in her payoff is
10In the spirit of an analysis that exploits the aggregative properties of the game, this approach is preferred to assuming
traders are homogeneous and differentiating equilibrium expressions with respect to the number of traders.
11Amir and Bloch [9] (Proposition 1) conclude that when traders are homogeneous and preferences are binormal, the
payoffs of traders on the opposite side of the market to the entrant increase. This proposition (and its analog when new buyers
enter) generalizes this result to the case of heterogeneous traders, but stronger assumptions than binormality are required
(which need only be satisfied in a sufficiently large neighborhood of the original equilibrium).
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duˆi = (−u
1
i + pˆu
2
i )dxˆi + xˆiu
2
idpˆ
= u2i [(xˆi/Xˆ)pˆdxˆi + xˆidpˆ] (3)
(Expression (8) in Appendix A gives the first-order condition used in the second line.)
The presence of an additional active seller lowers the equilibrium price, so if sellers reduce their
supply, they will receive a lower equilibrium payoff and the conventional wisdom applies. Conversely,
if a seller optimally increases her supply, her payoff may increase.
To explore the conditions under which this occurs, recall that sellers can be thought of as engaging in
a contest in which the aggregate bid is shared in proportion to supply to the market. In the presence of an
additional seller the contest is more competitive, but the size of the prize being contested may differ. How
much a seller should supply in this contest relative to her previous supply will depend on the conjectured
change in the aggregate bid in relation to the additional competitiveness of the contest, and this hinges
crucially on the elasticity of strategic demand defined12 in (1), as the following lemma demonstrates.
Lemma 6. When an additional seller enters the economy the change in supply of an existing seller i 2 IS
at the closest regular equilibrium satisfies
dxˆi > (=, <)0, ⌘(pˆ) > (=, <)
−1
pˆ
⇣
yˆ2
∂∂i(yˆ)
∂y2
− @i(yˆ)
⌘
xˆi/Xˆ
:= ⌘˜i (4)
Since buyers’ preferences are binormal, ⌘(pˆ) > 0. As such, if a seller’s preferences satisfy
DCS, (4) implies she will always increase her supply; such sellers have a strong preference to preserve
their money holdings, which, since the price reduces, requires supply to increase. A seller whose
preferences satisfy ICS (with a strict inequality) may either increase or reduce supply: her supply will
increase if the elasticity of strategic demand exceeds a certain threshold that is inversely related to her
market share (and also depends on her preferences), implying that supply only increases in the more
competitive contest if the size of the prize does not reduce too much. Notice that, other things equal, the
critical value of the elasticity is lower for sellers with a larger market share: smaller sellers might reduce
their supply at the same time as larger sellers increase supply.
It is instructive to consider the special case where sellers are modeled as profit-maximizing firms.13
In this case the condition for the elasticity in Expression (4) becomes ⌘(pˆ) > (=, <) 1
xˆi/Xˆ
− 1, so for
sellers that are not “dominant” (i.e., have market share less than 50%) to increase supply, the aggregate
bid must increase (i.e., strategic demand must be elastic), and increase by a sufficient amount that is
larger for sellers with smaller market share. If strategic demand is inelastic and there are no dominant
firms, then according to Lemma 6 all firms will reduce their supply and (3) can be used to deduce when
the conventional wisdom applies.
12η(p) = lim∆p!0 η(p,∆p) is, with a slight abuse of notation, the elasticity of strategic demand when infinitesimal
changes are considered where, if necessary, the appropriate one-sided derivative is used (in this case as ∆p! 0−).
13See the Remark in Section 2 and recall that in this case all sellers’ preferences everywhere satisfy ICS, implying the
equilibrium is unique.
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Corollary 7. Suppose the preferences of all buyers are both binormal and locally satisfy ICD, and that
sellers are profit-maximizing firms, none of which are dominant. Then when an additional firm enters
the economy, existing firms reduce their supply and their equilibrium profit declines.
When strategic demand is not too inelastic and there are sellers whose share of the market is not too
small, these sellers may optimally increase supply in the presence of an additional seller. As noted,
increasing supply is only a necessary condition for a seller’s payoff to increase; the sufficient condition
is presented in the next proposition.
Proposition 8. When an additional seller enters the economy, the payoff of seller i 2 IS at the closest
regular equilibrium increases (remains constant, decreases) if and only if
⌘(pˆ) > (=, <) ⌘˜i +
1
xˆi/Xˆ
Xˆ
pˆ
'ˆi := ⌘¯i (5)
where ⌘˜i is defined in (4) and, for i 2 I
S, 'ˆi := −
∂∂i(yˆ)
∂y1
+ pˆ∂∂i(yˆ)
∂y2
+ pˆ
Xˆ
, which is strictly positive when
preferences are binormal.
For a seller to increase supply, the elasticity of strategic demand must exceed ⌘˜i. For her payoff
to increase, it must exceed a higher threshold again related inversely to her market share and also to
preferences. The aggregate bid from the buyers must increase by an amount that ensures the seller’s
allocation of money increases and that the gain in utility from this more than outweighs the reduction
in utility from lower final holdings of the good after increasing supply. When sellers are modeled
as profit-maximizing firms ⌘¯i = ⌘˜i +
1
xˆi/Xˆ
(1 + (Xˆ/pˆ)C 00i (xˆi)) and a firm’s profit will increase when
strategic demand is sufficiently elastic, the firm has a large enough market share and its rate of increase
in marginal cost is not too high: when the firm increases supply in competing for its share of the total
revenue, for profit to increase its allocation of that revenue must increase by more than the increased cost
of production.
Notice that in a given entry scenario it might be the case that some sellers suffer a reduction in payoff
whilst others benefit from the change; if so it will be those sellers with a relatively large market share
that will benefit. Contrary to the substantial literature on entry deterrence, in thin bilateral oligopoly
environments in which strategic demand is sufficiently elastic there may be sellers that encourage the
entry of additional sellers to the market.
Whilst there may be market conditions in which entry by additional active sellers is en-
couraged by at least some existing sellers, when all sellers’ preferences everywhere satisfy
ICS, successive entry will eventually lead to the payoffs of incumbents decreasing with fur-
ther entry, implying that in large economies the conventional wisdom applies. This can
be deduced by the following reasoning. First, each seller’s market share decreases as new
active sellers enter the economy.14 Since the threshold that the elasticity of strategic de-
mand must exceed for a seller to enjoy a higher payoff in the presence of new entrants
14This is obvious when sellers are homogeneous. When the set of sellers is heterogeneous each seller’s share of the total
supply that is consistent with a Nash equilibrium in which the price and aggregate supply take particular values, denoted
sSi (p;X)—see Appendix A—is strictly decreasing in X and increasing in p when preferences satisfy ICS. Thus, for Xˆ
0 > Xˆ
and pˆ0 < pˆ, as is the case when a new active seller enters the market, each existing seller’s equilibrium market share will
decline.
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(see (5)) is inversely related to that seller’s market share, this means that with successive entry, strategic
demand must be increasingly elastic for payoff-increasing competition to be preserved. Whilst, when
moving “down” the strictly decreasing strategic demand curve (as is the case when additional sellers
enter the economy) elasticity may temporarily increase, this cannot be so globally. Thus, for a given set
of buyers (i.e., a given strategic demand function) there will be a critical density of sellers beyond which
all sellers’ payoffs will fall with the entry of additional sellers: when the economy is “large enough” the
conventional wisdom applies.15
7. Example Revisited
To illustrate the main points of the analysis, a more general form of the example from Section 3
will be considered. There are m ≥ 2 buyers each of which has an endowment of two units of money
and preferences given by u(y) = ↵y1 −
γ
2
y21 + y2, and n ≥ 2 sellers with quadratic costs given by
C(x) = βx + µ
2
x2. The arguments in Appendix A can be used to deduce that strategic supply takes the
form X (p) = −nβ
µ
+ n−1
µ
p with P S = n
n−1
β, and strategic demand takes the form D(p) = mα
γ
− m
2
(m−1)γ
p
with PB = m−1
m
↵ (both linear). Supposing that P S = n
n−1
β < m−1
m
↵ = PB (so that a non-autarkic Nash
equilibrium exists) the equilibrium price is pˆ = (m−1)(mαµ+nβγ)
(m−1)(n−1)γ+m2µ
and the equilibrium volume of trade is
Xˆ = m((m−1)(n−1)α−mnβ)
(m−1)(n−1)γ+m2µ
.
Set m = 4, ↵ = 3, β = 1/2 and µ = 5 (as in the example of Section 3), leaving γ, the buyers’
preference parameter and n, the number of sellers, as free parameters. In this case pˆ = 360+3nγ
160+6(n−1)γ
and Xˆ = 4(7n−9)
80+3(n−1)γ
; the former is decreasing in n whilst the latter is increasing in n for any γ > 0
(quasi-competitiveness).
Whether firms increase supply in the presence of new firms and enjoy increased profit depends on the
magnitude of the elasticity of strategic demand, which in this example is ⌘(pˆ) = 2(120+nγ)
γ(7n−9)
(decreasing in
both n and γ). Figure 2 plots the combinations of γ and nwhere (a) the elasticity is such that condition (4)
is satisfied with equality (the solid curve) and (b) the elasticity is such that condition (5) is satisfied
with equality (the dashed curve). To the south-west of these curves (i.e., for smaller n and/or γ) the
conditions are satisfied with a > inequality. Thus, to the south-west of the dashed curve profit-increasing
competition is observed. For any γ that is small enough profit-increasing competition will be observed
for small n, but there is a critical number of firms beyond which the conventional wisdom applies.
15If there are |IS| homogeneous sellers modeled as firms with constant marginal costs the conventional wisdom holds when
|IS| ≥ η(pˆ)−12 .
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Figure 2. Combinations of γ and n for which condition (4) is satisfied with equality (solid)
and condition (5) is satisfied with equality (dashed). To the south-west of these curves the
conditions hold with a> inequality, so to the south-west of the dashed curve profit-increasing
competition is observed.
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8. Entry of Buyers
Similar results to those derived for entry of additional sellers apply if the number of buyers increases
(with a fixed set of sellers). Since the analysis closely parallels that previously elucidated, the details
are omitted. If an additional buyer l enters the economy, then strategic demand increases for all
p < p⇤l . As such, at any regular equilibrium where pˆ < p
⇤
l , it follows that Xˆ
0 ≥ Xˆ and pˆ0 > pˆ, and
consequently that Bˆ0 > Bˆ (since B = pX). Analogous to Proposition 4, if all sellers’ preferences
are binormal and satisfy ICS (or all sellers are homogeneous) then each seller’s supply will not reduce
and their equilibrium payoffs will increase. With entry of additional sellers, the effect on the payoffs
of existing sellers was governed by the change in the size of the prize they contested (the aggregate
bid), measured by the elasticity of strategic demand. The prize shared by the buyers is the aggregate
supply, so the effect on existing buyers’ equilibrium bids and payoffs with the entry of additional
buyers is determined by the magnitude of ⇠(p) := lim∆p!0
∆X (p)
∆p
, the slope of strategic supply.16
Using deductions analogous to those in Lemma 6 and Proposition 8 (and utilizing Expressions (18)
and (19)) it can be shown that for an existing buyer i 2 IB
dbˆi > (=, <)0, ⇠(pˆ) > (=, <)
Bˆ
pˆ
0
B@
1
pˆ
⇣
yˆ1
∂∂i(yˆ)
∂y1
+ @i(yˆ)
⌘⇣
1− bˆi
Bˆ
⌘2
bˆi
Bˆ
− 1
1
CA := ⇠˜i (6)
and their payoff increases (remains constant, decreases) if and only if
⇠(pˆ) > (=, <) ⇠˜i +
(bˆi/pˆ)(1− bˆi/Bˆ)
2 |'ˆi|
(bˆi/Bˆ)2(pˆ/Bˆ)
:= ⇠¯i (7)
16If necessary, the appropriate one-sided derivative should be used in defining ξ(p), which in this case is as ∆p! 0+.
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where, for i 2 IB, 'ˆi :=
1
pˆ
∂∂i(yˆ)
∂y1
− ∂∂i(yˆ)
∂y2
− pˆ/Bˆ
(1−bˆi/Bˆ)2
, which is strictly negative when preferences
are binormal.
Finally, suppose there is entry to both sides of the market (attention here is focused on equilibrium
aggregates). Consider a regular equilibrium with price pˆ and suppose an additional seller k with p⇤k < pˆ
and an additional buyer l with p⇤l > pˆ join the economy (and that the set of equilibria is preserved). Since
strategic supply and demand are constructed independently of the details of the other side of the market,
it follows that the conclusions for the entry of sellers and buyers separately can be applied to deduce
the change in strategic supply and demand functions: strategic supply increases for prices exceeding
p⇤k and strategic demand increases for prices below p
⇤
l . Since strategic demand is decreasing in p, it is
easily deduced by visual inspection of Figure 1 that Xˆ 0 > Xˆ . To determine the effect on the equilibrium
aggregate bid, there are two cases to consider: (a) if pˆ0 ≥ pˆ then since Bˆ = pˆXˆ it is immediate that
Bˆ0 > Bˆ; (b) if pˆ0 < pˆ then a relatively straightforward modification of Lemma 2 (which demonstrated
that for a given set of buyers B(p) is decreasing in p if all buyers’ preferences satisfy ECD) implies that
under the same conditions on preferences the aggregate bid in the presence of an additional buyer will
also be higher. This allows the conclusion in the following proposition.
Proposition 9. Suppose the preferences of all buyers are both binormal and locally satisfy ECD. Then
when an additional buyer and seller enter the economy, both the aggregate supply and the aggregate bid
increase at any regular equilibrium with p⇤k < pˆ < p
⇤
l .
17
If all sellers’ preferences everywhere satisfy ICS, then strategic supply is non-decreasing and the
conclusions of Proposition 9 apply to the unique non-autarkic Nash equilibrium. If all buyers’
preferences everywhere satisfy ECD, the conclusions apply under arbitrary expansion of the set of
traders. Amir and Bloch [9] (Proposition 3) demonstrate that aggregate offers and bids monotonically
increase under replication of the economy but require the arguably strong gross substitutes condition
to hold for all traders (i.e., all traders’ preferences satisfy strict versions of both ICS and ECD).
Proposition 9 thus represents a substantial weakening of the assumptions required for monotonicity
of the aggregate bid and aggregate supply under entry to both sides of the market, and therefore for
monotonic convergence of equilibrium aggregates along an appropriate replication sequence.
9. Conclusions
By exploiting the aggregative structure of the strategic market game, it has been possible to undertake
a comprehensive study of the effects of entry in bilateral oligopoly without making any assumptions that
restrict the heterogeneity of traders or imposing overly restrictive assumptions on their payoffs. As well
as considering entry on both sides of the market, entry to each side of the market in turn was studied.
It was found that bilateral oligopoly is quasi-competitive (the volume of trade increases, and the price
reduces when additional sellers enter and increases when additional buyers enter), and that the payoffs
of traders on the same side of the market to the entrant can increase so long as traders on the other
side of the market sufficiently increase their market strategies. In particular, with increased supply-side
17As with entry to one side of the market, this extends to arbitrary expansion of the sets of buyers and sellers and regular
equilibria where min{p⇤k} < pˆ < max{p
⇤
l } (the set of which should be preserved).
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competition, if the elasticity of demand exceeds a threshold that is inversely related to a seller’s market
share, that seller will enjoy a higher pay-off at the new equilibrium. Likewise, with increased demand-
side competition, a buyer can be made better off if the slope of strategic supply exceeds a threshold that
is inversely related to her market share. This raises the possibility that in markets with few participants,
incumbents with sufficiently large market shares may encourage new entrants to their side of the market,
in contrast to the extensive literature on entry deterrence.
Appendix
A. Strategic Supply and Demand
With the intention of providing a self-contained treatment, this section presents a description of the
method of analysis that exploits the aggregative properties of the game played to construct strategic
supply and demand functions, intersections of which identify non-autarkic Nash equilibria in the game,
first presented in Dickson and Hartley [8].
On the supply side, each seller i 2 IS may be seen as choosing her supply to maximize her payoff
given the choices of all other agents in the economy, thereby solving the problem
max
x2[0,ei]
ui(ei − x, xp)
where p = B/X , X = x + X−i and X−i =
P
j 6=i2IS xj . The first-order condition (which is both
necessary and sufficient for identifying best responses when preferences are binormal) reveals that the
best response of seller i 2 IS to a supply of other sellers totalling X−i and bids totalling B takes
the form ⇢
x : @i
✓
ei − x,
x
x+X−i
B
◆
≥
✓
1−
x
x+X−i
◆
B
x+X−i
}
(8)
with equality if x > 0.
Instead of working with best responses directly, the method derives from these the behavior of agents
that is consistent with a Nash equilibrium in which the aggregates take particular values. Accordingly,
the supply of seller i 2 IS consistent with a non-autarkic Nash equilibrium in which the aggregate supply
is X > 0 and the price is p is given by XsSi (p;X), where s
S
i (p;X) = min{σ, ei/X} is the share function
of seller i, σ being the unique solution to
@i(ei − σX, σXp) ≥ (1− σ)p (9)
with equality if σ > 0. Define p⇤i = @i(ei, 0) as the price below which seller i’s supply would be zero
regardless of the actions of her opponents. Then when preferences are binormal sSi (p;X) = 0 for all
X > 0 when p  p⇤i , whilst for p > p
⇤
i the share function will take positive values, vary continuously
with X and p, and be strictly decreasing in X > 0 with the property that limX!0 s
S
i (p;X) = 1−
p∗
i
p
([8],
Lemma 3.1).
Share functions give consistent behavior at the individual level. Equilibrium requires consistency of
aggregate behavior. Consistency of aggregate supply with a non-autarkic Nash equilibrium in which the
price takes a particular value requires the sum of the individual supplies of sellers to be equal to the
Games 2013, 4 298
aggregate supply, or for the aggregate share function SS(p;X) =
P
j2IS s
S
j (p;X) to be equal to one.
Defining X (p) by
SS(p;X (p)) = 1 (10)
the values of X belonging to X (p) give the levels of aggregate supply that are consistent with a Nash
equilibrium in which the price is p. Since share functions are strictly decreasing in X , their sum inherits
this property, so for each p there is at most one value of X satisfying SS(p;X) = 1, and X (p) is called
the strategic supply function.18
Strategic supply is defined only above some cutoff price, P S, which is such that
X
j2IS
max
⇢
0, 1−
p⇤j
P S
}
= 1 (11)
When sellers’ payoffs satisfy ICS, share functions are non-decreasing in p and it follows that
strategic supply not only varies continuously with p > P S but also has the desirable property that it is
non-decreasing in p ([8], Lemma 5.2).
Similar considerations apply to the demand side, which will culminate in a strategic demand function.
Each buyer i 2 IB can be seen as maximizing her utility from consumption over her choice of bid, i.e.,
solving the problem
max
b2[0,mi]
ui(b/p,mi − b)
where again p = B/X , B = b + B−i and B−i =
P
j 6=i2IB bj . Under the assumption of binormality of
preferences, the first-order condition is both necessary and sufficient in identifying best responses, which
take the form (
b : @i
✓
b
b+B−i
X,mi − b
◆

✓
1−
b
b+B−i
◆−1
b+B−i
X
)
(12)
with equality if b > 0. Looking for buyer i’s bid that is consistent with a Nash equilibrium in which
the aggregate bid is B > 0 and the price is p, define the share function of buyer i 2 IB by sBi (p;B) =
min{σ,mi/B}, where σ is the unique solution to
@i(σB/p,mi − σB)  (1− σ)
−1p (13)
with equality if σ > 0. When multiplied by B, the share function gives the bid of buyer i 2 IB consistent
with a non-autarkic Nash equilibrium in which the aggregate bid is B > 0 and the price is p.
For each i 2 IB define p⇤i = @i(0,mi), which is the price above which buyer i would never make a
bid for the consumption good regardless of the actions of other buyers. Then buyer i’s share function is
defined for all 0 < p < p⇤i where it is continuous, decreasing in both B and p and has the property that
limB!0 s
B
i (p;B) = 1−
p
p∗
i
([8], Lemmas 3.3 and 5.1).
18When sellers are modeled as profit-maximizing firms, the analysis is the same when costs are strictly convex but with
∂i(ei − σX, σXp) = C
0
i(σX). When firms have constant marginal costs (say C
0
i(x) = ci), then s
S
i (p;X) = 1 − ci/p, so
strategic supply is perfectly elastic at p = 1n−1
P
j2IS cj and is otherwise undefined. In the presence of an additional buyer,
the analysis parallels that in the text except the price remains constant. The analysis of entry to the supply side remains the
same so long as the new firm has ck 
1
n−1
P
j2IS cj (as is the case with homogeneous firms).
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Consistent behavior of the buyers at the aggregate level requires the sum of individual bids to be equal
to the aggregate bid, or for the aggregate share function of the buyers SB(p;B) =
P
j2IB s
B
j (p;B) to
be equal to one. Instead of looking for the aggregate bid consistent with a particular price, it is more
convenient to consider the level of demand, given by the ratio of aggregate bid to price, that is consistent
with a non-autarkic equilibrium in which the price takes a particular value. Thus, let D(p) be defined by
SB(p; pD(p)) = 1 (14)
then D(p) is the strategic demand function, giving the level of demand consistent with a non-autarkic
Nash equilibrium in which the price is p. Strategic demand is defined for all 0 < p < PB where PB is a
cutoff price above which demand is zero in any Nash equilibrium with such a price, and is defined by
X
j2IB
max
⇢
0, 1−
PB
p⇤j
}
= 1 (15)
When preferences are binormal it can be shown that the strategic demand function is strictly
decreasing in 0 < p < PB ([8], Lemma 5.1).
The purpose of constructing these functions lies in the fact that non-autarkic Nash equilibria
in bilateral oligopoly are in one-to-one correspondence with intersections of strategic supply and
demand ([8], Proposition 3.5). In particular there is a non-autarkic Nash equilibrium with price pˆ if
and only if
X (pˆ) = D(pˆ) (16)
It follows that a non-autarkic equilibrium exists if and only if P S < PB (i.e., strategic supply and
demand cross). The condition P S < PB requires that there are “sufficient” gains from trade in the
economy. At a non-autarkic equilibrium with price pˆ the volume of trade is Xˆ = X (pˆ) and the aggregate
bid from the buyers is Bˆ = pˆXˆ . The equilibrium supply of seller i 2 IS is xˆi = Xˆs
S
i (pˆ; Xˆ) and the
equilibrium bid of buyer i 2 IB is bˆi = Bˆs
B
i (pˆ; Bˆ).
B. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2. For 0 < p < PB the consistent aggregate bid B(p) is given by
SB(p;B(p)) = 1. It was noted in Appendix A that individual share functions are strictly decreasing in
B > 0, and the aggregate share function inherits this property. As will be shown, it therefore suffices to
demonstrate that the aggregate share function is decreasing in p when all buyers’ preferences satisfy ECD
and strictly increasing if all buyers’ preferences satisfy ICD, and the proof proceeds by demonstrating
these properties for individual share functions.
Suppose that for buyer i 2 IB y1@i(y) is increasing in y1 (ECD). Then suppose contrary to the claim
that for p0 > p, σ0 = sBi (p
0;B) > sBi (p;B) = σ. Then mi − σ
0B < mi − σB, and the proof is
split into two cases. In case (i) σ0B/p0 ≥ σB/p. Then binormality implies @i(σ
0B/p0,mi − σ
0B) 
@i(σB/p,mi − σB). However, using the first-order condition this implies (1 − σ
0)−1p0  (1 − σ)−1p,
a contradiction. In case (ii) σ0B/p0 < σB/p, and the fact that y1@i(y) is increasing in y1 is used to
deduce that
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σ0B
p0
@i
✓
σ0B
p0
,mi − σ
0B
◆

σB
p
@i
✓
σB
p
,mi − σ
0B
◆
However, since mi − σ
0B  mi − σB, binormality implies that
σB
p
@i
✓
σB
p
,mi − σ
0B
◆

σB
p
@i
✓
σB
p
,mi − σB
◆
Combining these inequalities and using the first-order condition (12) gives
σ0B
p0
(1− σ0)−1p0 
σB
p
(1− σ)−1p
which, after canceling terms, leads to a contradiction.
Thus, for p0 > p, sBi (p
0;B)  sBi (p;B) for all B > 0, for each i 2 I
B. As such, SB(p0;B)  SB(p;B)
for all B > 0. In particular for 0 < p < PB, SB(p0;B(p))  SB(p;B(p)) = 1. Since SB is strictly
decreasing in B > 0, this implies that B(p0)  B(p).
Next consider the case when y1@i(y) strictly decreases in y1 (ICD). Suppose contrary to the claim that
for p0 > p, σ0 = sBi (p
0;B)  sBi (p;B) = σ. Then mi − σ
0B ≥ mi − σB and σ
0B/p0 < σB/p. The fact
that y1@i(y) strictly decreases in y1 can then be used to deduce that
σ0B
p0
@i
✓
σ0B
p0
, e− σ0B
◆
>
σB
p
@i
✓
σB
p
,mi − σ
0B
◆
≥
σB
p
@i
✓
σB
p
,mi − σB
◆
where the last inequality is due to binormality. However, using the first-order condition (12), this implies
σ0B
p0
(1− σ0)−1p0 >
σB
p
(1− σ)−1p
which, after canceling terms, yields a contradiction. Thus, sBi (p
0;B) > sBi (p;B) and if the additional
restriction on preferences holds for all buyers, this implies SB(p0,B(p)) > SB(p,B(p)) = 1 with the
implication that B(p0) > B(p).
Proof of Proposition 4. To prove that buyers’ equilibrium payoffs increase under the conditions of the
proposition, it must be shown that individual bids (weakly) increase. Corollary 3 deduced that when all
buyers’ preferences satisfy ECD, the aggregate bid increases (which also implies that when buyers are
homogeneous their individual bids increase), but when the buyer set is heterogeneous, monotonicity of
individual bids has yet to be proved.
The bid of an active buyer i 2 IB consistent with a Nash equilibrium in which the aggregate bid is
B > 0 and the price is p is given by b˜i(p;B) = Bs
B
i (p;B), which is such that
b˜i(p;B) = {b : @i(b/p,mi − b) = (1− b/B)
−1p} (17)
The proof involves demonstrating that b˜i(p;B) is strictly increasing in B and, when the buyer’s
preferences also satisfy ECD, that it is decreasing in p. When an additional seller enters pˆ0 < pˆ and,
when all buyers’ preferences satisfy ECD, Bˆ0 ≥ Bˆ, so the desired result is implied. The monotonicity
properties of b˜i(p;B) can be demonstrated by methods that allow for discrete changes in B and p, but
attention is restricted to small changes because this is what is required for the proof, and the expressions
derived are utilized elsewhere.
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Implicit differentiation of (17) yields19
@b˜i(p;B)
@B
=
(b˜i/B)(p/B)
(1−b˜i/B)2∣∣∣1p ∂∂i(y)∂y1 − ∂∂i(y)∂y2 − p/B(1−b˜i/B)2
∣∣∣ > 0 and (18)
@b˜i(p;B)
@p
=
−1
p
⇣
y1
∂∂i(y)
∂y1
+ @i(y)
⌘
∣∣∣1p ∂∂i(y)∂y1 − ∂∂i(y)∂y2 − p/B(1−b˜i/B)2
∣∣∣ (19)
Now,
dbˆi =
@b˜i(pˆ; Bˆ)
@B
dBˆ +
@b˜i(pˆ; Bˆ)
@p
dpˆ
and when the preferences of all buyers satisfy ECD, both dBˆ ≥ 0 and for each buyer y1
∂∂i(y)
∂y1
+@i(y) ≥ 0,
implying @b˜i(p;B)/@p  0. Since dpˆ < 0, it follows that dbˆi ≥ 0.
Proof of Lemma 6. The supply of seller i 2 IS consistent with a Nash equilibrium in which the aggregate
supply is X > 0 and the price is p is given by x˜i(p;X) = Xs
S
i (p;X), so
x˜i(p;X) = {x : @i(ei − x, xp) ≥ (1− x/X)p} (20)
with equality if x > 0. Now,
dxˆi =
@x˜i(pˆ; Xˆ)
@X
dXˆ +
@x˜i(pˆ; Xˆ)
@p
dpˆ
= dpˆ
"
@x˜i(pˆ; Xˆ)
@X
dXˆ
dpˆ
+
@x˜i(pˆ; Xˆ)
@p
#
Implicit differentiation of (20) yields
@x˜i(p;X)
@X
=
(x˜i/X
2)p
−∂∂i(y)
∂y1
+ p∂∂i(y)
∂y2
+ p
X
and (21)
@x˜i(p;X)
@p
= −
1
p
⇣
y2
∂∂i(y)
∂y2
− @i(y)
⌘
−∂∂i(y)
∂y1
+ p∂∂i(y)
∂y2
+ p
X
(22)
As such,
dxˆi =
dpˆ
'ˆi
"
xˆi
Xˆ
pˆ
Xˆ
dXˆ
dpˆ
−
1
pˆ
✓
yˆ2
@@i(yˆ)
@y2
− @i(yˆ)
◆#
(23)
(recall that for i 2 IS, 'ˆi := −
∂∂i(yˆ)
∂y1
+ pˆ∂∂i(yˆ)
∂y2
+ pˆ
Xˆ
> 0 when preferences are binormal). With the
introduction of a seller, dXˆ = dD(pˆ)
dp
dpˆ. Utilizing this, the elasticity of strategic demand defined in (1),
and recalling that dpˆ < 0, gives
dxˆi > (=, <)0, ⌘(pˆ) > (=, <)
−1
pˆ
⇣
yˆ2
∂∂i(yˆ)
∂y2
− @i(yˆ)
⌘
xˆi/Xˆ
19Recall that when preferences are binormal ∂∂i(y)/∂y1 < 0 and ∂∂i(y)/∂y2 ≥ 0, implying
1
p
∂∂i(y)
∂y1
− ∂∂i(y)∂y2 −
p/B
(1−b˜i/B)2
< 0.
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Proof of Proposition 8. Recall from (3) that the change in payoff of seller i 2 IS is
duˆi = u
2
i [(xˆi/Xˆ)pˆdxˆi + xˆidpˆ]
Substituting (23) gives
duˆi =
u2idpˆ
'ˆi
"
xˆi
Xˆ
pˆ
 
xˆi
Xˆ
pˆ
Xˆ
dXˆ
dpˆ
−
1
pˆ
✓
yˆ2
@@i(yˆ)
@y2
− @i(yˆ)
◆!
+ xˆi'ˆi
#
Upon entry of an additional seller, dpˆ < 0, so for seller i 2 IS, d⇡ˆi > (=, <)0 if and only if the
term in the square brackets is less than (equal to, greater than) zero. Noting dXˆ = dD(pˆ)
dp
dpˆ and using the
expression for the elasticity of strategic demand in (1) gives
⌘(pˆ) > (=, <)
−1
pˆ
⇣
yˆ2
∂∂i(yˆ)
∂y2
− @i(yˆ)
⌘
xˆi/Xˆ
+
1
xˆi/Xˆ
Xˆ
pˆ
'ˆi
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